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We propose a Survival Optimization System (SOS) to account for the strategies that
humans and other animals use to defend against recurring and novel threats. The
SOS attempts to merge ecological models that define a repertoire of contextually
relevant threat induced survival behaviors with contemporary approaches to human
affective science. We first propose that the goal of the nervous system is to reduce
surprise and optimize actions by (i) predicting the sensory landscape by simulating
possible encounters with threat and selecting the appropriate pre-encounter action
and (ii) prevention strategies in which the organism manufactures safe environments.
When a potential threat is encountered the (iii) threat orienting system is engaged to
determine whether the organism ignores the stimulus or switches into a process of (iv)
threat assessment, where the organism monitors the stimulus, weighs the threat value,
predicts the actions of the threat, searches for safety, and guides behavioral actions
crucial to directed escape. When under imminent attack, (v) defensive systems evoke
fast reflexive indirect escape behaviors (i.e., fight or flight). This cascade of responses to
threat of increasing magnitude are underwritten by an interconnected neural architecture
that extends from cortical and hippocampal circuits, to attention, action and threat
systems including the amygdala, striatum, and hard-wired defensive systems in the
midbrain. The SOS also includes a modulatory feature consisting of cognitive appraisal
systems that flexibly guide perception, risk and action. Moreover, personal and vicarious
threat encounters fine-tune avoidance behaviors via model-based learning, with higher
organisms bridging data to reduce face-to-face encounters with predators. Our model
attempts to unify the divergent field of human affective science, proposing a highly
integrated nervous system that has evolved to increase the organism’s chances of
survival.
Keywords: survival optimization system, defensive distance, fear, anxiety, periaqueductal gray, amygdala,
appraisal
Introduction
Charles Darwin declared that organisms unable to adapt to the demands of their environ-
ment will fail to pass on their genes and consequently fall as casualties in the “war of
nature” (Darwin, 1871). One of the most pervasive ecological demands is predatory avoid-
ance. The relentless pressure to outwit predators while balancing homeostatic threats, such as
resource depletion, has produced a nervous system that optimizes survival actions. These optimal
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actions provide the organism with a survival intelligence that
permits appropriate responses to an array of environments and
circumstances that range from non-threatening to life endanger-
ing. In humans this behavioral repertoire is supported by a neu-
robiological system that has endowed us with a powerful set of
intelligent survival mechanisms, promoting adaptation to chang-
ing ecologies and efficient navigation of natural dangers. Building
off of a set of well-known neural systems, recent insights from
human and comparative neuroscience have demonstrated that
midbrain regions are involved in phylogenetically older adapta-
tions such as reflexive fight, flight, or freeze (FFF) systems and
are strongly interconnected, innervated by, and in competition
with, forebrain structures including the prefrontal cortex (PFC)
and amygdala (Öngür et al., 2003; Price, 2005; Mobbs et al., 2007;
Price and Drevets, 2010).
Innovations in the field of affective neuroscience offer new
insights on existing theories concerning the phylogenetic conti-
nuity and discontinuity of survival responses from lower animals
to humans (Panksepp, 1998, 2005; McNaughton and Corr, 2004;
Woody and Boyer, 2011; Adolphs, 2013). Importantly, while
many of these models have focused on rodent responses to threat,
our human ancestors were under many of the same selection
pressures common to all other animals, yet the cross-applicability
of these hard-wired systems to human threat response, includ-
ing fight, flight, freezing and startle reactions has often been
overlooked. However, unique pressures may also play a role in
human survival intelligence—these extend from cunningness,
an understanding of others’ sinister desires, and metacogni-
tive processes including meta-strategic knowledge (Zohar and
David, 2009). Thus, higher-level and more integrated cogni-
tive and computational systems embedded in our nervous sys-
tem are likely to be critical to human survival. A compelling
narrative on the survival systems that are evoked to protect
the human organism against predatory threat must therefore
be multi-disciplinary, encompassing ideas not only from the
provinces of behavioral ecology, ethology and evolutionary biol-
ogy but also from behavioral, social, cognitive and computational
neuroscience.
In this article, we gather ecological theories and empirical
data from a variety of related fields in an attempt to create
a unified model of how humans predict, respond to, control
and learn about danger. We will discuss hierarchical theories
of threat, how these hierarchies are represented within a global
neural architecture, and present evidence for components of
an optimized survival system in humans, which is consistent
with (c.f. Blanchard et al., 2011), and sometimes distinct from
those observed in other animals. The Survival Optimization Sys-
tem (SOS) is based on the assumption that a set of systems
have evolved to avoid and combat threats that pose danger to
the species’ fitness. These extend from neurocognitive systems
that predict the sensory environment, orienting toward potential
threat, assessing threat and escape possibilities, and to hard-wired
defensive reactions instantiated by the oldest sectors of the ner-
vous system. In tandem, these survival strategies are steered by
modulatory systems including cognitive appraisal and learning
systems.
Survival in Nature
Natural selection increases fitness by optimizing survival relevant
behaviors within a given species’ environment. We therefore
define survival intelligence as the organism’s ability to master its
environment by minimizing local threats and adapting to novel
threats in changing ecologies. Responses to predatory threat
depend on both flexible and fixed behavioral traits. The pres-
ence of fixed traits implies that predatory threat is pervasive and
expressed across a species’ evolutionary time (Nonacs and Dill,
1993), hard-wired and developed by gradualism or other evolu-
tionary methods particular to the species (Gould and Eldredge,
1977). Flexible (or plastic) traits are associated with the ability to
modify actions in the animal’s ecological time (i.e., the animal’s
lifetime). As predicted by the theory of the “predatory-prey arms
race,” these traits co-evolve in both predators and prey. Thus,
an animal is continuously adapting to sustain its viability in an
ever-changing ecological system (Van Valen, 1973). In perpetual
fashion, changes in evolutionary time result in changes in eco-
logical time and possibly vice versa via Baldwinian mechanisms
(e.g., those species with greater capacity to learn new skills that
enhance the ability to avoid predators will pass on their genes
and avoidance skills). Although some theorists dispute such co-
evolution in predators and prey (Rosenzweig et al., 1987), other
evolutionary pressures (e.g., environmental stresses including cli-
mate change, disease, resource availability, and migrating alien
species) have sculpted cognitive, behavioral and neurobiological
phenotypes that form fast-track systems in the prey’s perception,
attention, and decision-making.
Ecological Models of Predator-Prey Encounters
While behavior and outcomes in predator-prey interactions are
likely to be more complex and prone to species-specific differ-
ences, Lima and Dill (1990) have proposed that the predation risk
or probability of being killed over a certain time interval can be
captured by the following equation:
P(getting killed)= 1− exp(−αdT).
where α is the rate of predator and prey encounters, d is the prob-
ability of death given an encounter and T is the time spent in
situations of predation risk. The authors propose that α, d, and
T are the basic building blocks to predation risk and accessible
to be used by the prey for its benefit. If the predator is pre-
dictable or stays in the same patch for long periods of time α will
be low. Access to α may also be adjusted by territory markings,
margins of safety or vicarious learning (Lima and Dill, 1990).
Therefore, according to this model, minimizing the number of
threat encounters, and reducing the level of danger and duration
of these encounters will maximize survival.
While the behavioral options that control predation risk may
still be unclear, Lima and Dill (1990) created a flow chart char-
acterizing predator-prey encounters (Figure 1). The Lima and
Dill model charts the interactive permutations that characterize
predator and prey interactions and the probabilities of escape or
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FIGURE 1 | Lima and Dill’s predator-prey model. Flow chart
displaying possible outcomes of a predator-prey encounter. The symbols
signify the conditional probabilities of each step of the pathway. a,
avoid; e, escape; I, ignore; p, probability that the prey detects the
predator first; q, probability that the predator detects the prey first
(adapted from Lima and Dill, 1990).
death. The authors propose that the probability of death (d) asso-
ciated with a predatory encounter can be denoted as a set of prob-
abilities that an encounter with a predator will occur. Therefore,
d can be defined as:
d = [p(1− a)(1− i1)(1− e1)+q(1− i2)(1− e2)](1− e3).
The goal of the organism is to facilitate behaviors that enhance p
(detect the predator first) and reduce detection by the predator
(q). When the threat is distal, the animal tends to enhance a (e.g.,
freezing), whereas when the threat is attacking, and presumably
proximal, the animal will facilitate flight/fight responses. Finally,
if the animal is caught, fight and flight responses are supported
by analgesic responses that suppress otherwise disabling pain and
enhance escape behaviors. Lima and Dill (1990) suggest that the
subcomponents of their equation (e1, e2) are known to the prey,
including knowledge of escape routes, distance to predator and
margin of safety. It is access to these subcomponents that allows
the prey to have some behavioral control over risk. Furthermore,
optimal prey survival involves the ability to spot the predator (p)
before being spotted (q). Conversely, optimal predatory behav-
ior involves attacking the unsuspecting prey (1 − i2). The goal
of higher animals is to avoid such encounter situations by simu-
lating the conditions to produce possible outcomes and reducing
the likelihood of predator encounters.
Species-Specific and Ecological Factors
The survival strategies of the species determines how the
probabilities are expressed in Lima and Dill’s model. Niche-
independent animals that navigate multiple habitats have evolved
to successfully adapt to changing and unpredictable predators
through the use of a plastic set of cognitive and behavioral
systems. According to the “Predator Recognition Continuum
Hypothesis,” prey that are exposed to a large variety of predators
should display the greatest plasticity in responses to threat (Fer-
rari et al., 2007) and receive the greatest benefit from recogniz-
ing and identifying different types of predators. The particular
calculations made by the prey are determined by the type of
predator encountered. For human-human encounters, the cal-
culations are likely to be complex. Our Pleistocene ancestors
were masters at adapting to changing environments and solving
problems under novel circumstances. Supporting this theory, the
human brain is specialized in improvisation, where cells become
tuned to adaptively code current information that is relevant
to the present environment (Duncan, 2001). These cells essen-
tially become multi-specialized, able to adapt to participate in
different functions. This theory of adaptive coding is supported
by research using non-human primate electrophysiology (Freed-
man et al., 2001) and suggests that the brain remains plastic in
order to flexibly and optimally cope with a changing world. These
cells are likely to be more numerous in humans and are proba-
bly located in the prefrontal cortex, as frontal regions are highly
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interconnected suggesting significant interaction and exchange,
and are critical to the monitoring, correction, and control of
behavior (Miller and Cohen, 2001).
Like other animals, humans make use of a reflexive set of sys-
tems to combat encountered threats that are neither predicted
nor detected in time to be avoided. Fixed traits are innate, evolu-
tionarily stable strategies that are widely prevalent across mam-
mals including passive (e.g., freezing) and active defensives (i.e.,
fight or flight) that are evoked when the animal detects or engages
a threat. Freezing is a simple yet powerful avoidance strategy that
reduces motion and visibility, thereby facilitating and enhanc-
ing the gathering of information and increasing the possibility
of disengaging the distal predator’s attention. The proposed goal
of flight is to increase the distance between the predator and
prey, thereby increasing the chances of escaping. Finally, the fight
response is a last resort when other strategies have been exhausted
or no other strategy is feasible, such as when escape is not pos-
sible, and aims to discourage the predator from further attack
(Blanchard and Blanchard, 1990a,b). These survival abilities may
have developed in early niche-dependent animals, where a clear
set of successful ecological rules governed simple fixed defensive
responses.
While most mammals possess a subset of these flexible and
fixed traits, the most salient feature of our framework is the
speculation that modern day humans are particularly reliant
on flexible systems that make use of sophisticated prediction
(e.g., mental simulation) and learning strategies to avoid danger.
Humans have a great capacity to learn what is important in
changing environments and optimize behaviors accordingly to
fulfill new goals (e.g., the importance of secondary reinforcers
such as money). We speculate that the fidelity of both flexible
and fixed neural survival circuits may equate to the extinction-
resistance of the organism, and that flexible systems in humans
permit our survival in the least optimal of circumstances. While
differences between current and evolutionary environments sug-
gest that fixed systems may be the source of problems (e.g.,
stress), we further speculate that a side effect of extensive flexibil-
ity (e.g., the ability to cognize about future oriented threat) may
render humans vulnerable to psychopathology.
Hierarchical Models of Survival
Darwin proposed that fear manifests along a gradient from atten-
tion to extreme terror (Darwin, 1871). Likewise, Kavaliers and
Choleris (2001) suggest the existence of an “apprehension gradi-
ent” which extends from no interest to complete preoccupation
with the predator. Some theorists differentiate fear from anxi-
ety by proposing that fear results from the presence of highly
imminent or tangible threat, while anxiety occurs when an aver-
sive stimulus is abstract or remote in time or space (Rachman,
1979; Bouton et al., 2001). Likewise, research conducted by Blan-
chard et al. in rodents suggests three levels of danger; potential
threat, distal threat, and proximal threat (Blanchard et al., 1986).
Clinical researchers further differentiate fear into three separate
components—the subjective apprehension of threat, physiolog-
ical arousal, and behavior as attempts to avoid the threaten-
ing stimulus (Rachman, 1979). Contemporary theorists such as
LeDoux (2012) propose that the concept “fear” is incorrectly
used to capture a constellation of conscious feelings and behav-
ioral and physiological responses, and this confuses and impairs
progress in understanding the neural systems that underlie emo-
tion. LeDoux’s remedy is to examine “threat-induced defensive
reactions” to distinguish feelings from brain/bodily responses,
proposing that this bifurcation better reflects the way the brain
has evolved and facilitates the assessment of similar processes in
animal brains (Mobbs et al., 2009; Perkins et al., 2009; LeDoux,
2013).
LeDoux’s sentiments are reflected in Fanselow and Lester’s
“Threat Imminence Continuum” model in which distinct threat-
states change depending on whether a threat is absent, detected,
or attacking (Fanselow and Lester, 1988). This continuum
encompasses four core stages: (i) the Preferred phase is the time
period when the animal is in a safe place, such as a nest or home
dwelling. It is also assumed that the animal is free from homeo-
static threats such as resource-depletion; (ii) The Pre-Encounter
phase is the time period where the risk of threat is present,
although there is no detectable presence of danger. An exam-
ple would be a bird’s move from the nest to the forest floor. The
Pre-Encounter phase is therefore most evident when the animal
is foraging for food or engaging in coitus. (iii) Post-Encounter
threat is when a threat is detected, but there is no direct interac-
tion between the prey and predator (e.g., the predator has not yet
detected the prey) and (iv) Circa-Strike threat is the stage where
the predator not only sees, but starts to pursue the prey with the
intention of capture and consumption.
These different phases of imminence evoke stereotyped defen-
sive behaviors in rodents, where the animal will choose strategies
to prevent or defer its progression down the imminence con-
tinuum (Fanselow and Lester, 1988). Relative to the Preferred
context, the Pre-Encounter phase is characterized by increased
vigilance and arousal. Contextual fear conditioning may occur
during subsequent encounters with the predator in the same con-
text. Of course, species will differ in their defensive reactions
(Bolles and Grossen, 1970). During the Post-Encounter phase,
freezing behaviors and adaptive autonomic responses, such as
increased sweating and piloerection are typically observed. One
potential purpose of these responses may be to decrease body
temperature, thereby thwarting (reptilian) predators that use heat
sensitivity to detect prey. Most animals will, however, flee from
an approaching or looming threat (Blumstein, 2006), particu-
larly when a safe refuge is available (Blanchard and Blanchard,
1990a). On the other hand, humansmay bemore prone to exhibit
fear responses that have evolved through our complex social
interactions, as opposed to the stereotyped responses commonly
observed in rodents.
If Post-Encounter behaviors fail, the animal will be pursued by
the predator, evoking a switch to Circa-Strike defensive behaviors
that are characterized by active coping strategies such as flight
and near-contact fighting. The spatial distance to the threat may
moderate these responses. For example, when a rat is placed in
a box at a far distance from a cat, the rat will freeze or flee if
there is an escape route, yet when the box is placed nearer to
the cat, the rat will panic, displaying active flight or fight (Blan-
chard and Blanchard, 1990a) responses. Therefore, the threat
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context and distance to the threat are both crucial for elic-
iting particular defense strategies. The type of predator (e.g.,
bird or snake) also influences the prey’s response. For example,
the direction or velocity of the predator’s approach (Fanselow
and Lester, 1988) elicits different behavioral response strate-
gies (e.g., crouching or freezing) by the prey. Furthermore, the
predator’s size and attack strategy plays a critical role in deter-
mining whether the prey is likely to engage in fight vs. flight
behaviors.
Building off rodent and human clinical neuroscience,
McNaughton and Corr (2004) proposed that two parallel defen-
sive systems exist: (i) A defensive approach system, which is asso-
ciated with approach anxiety during foraging (i.e., checking if
a stimulus is a threat or food); (ii) A defensive avoidance sys-
tem allied with panic or fear. The defensive avoidance system
is typically engaged when a potential threat is moving closer or
attacking. Blanchard and Blanchard have proposed that small
distances result in explosive attack, whereas intermediate and
large distances result in freezing and non-defensive behaviors,
respectively. Another important element that determines which
defensive strategy an organism selects is the perceived control-
lability of the situation (Maier and Watkins, 2005). Highly con-
trollable situations are likely to elicit flight responses whereas
uncontrollable or inescapable situations are likely to elicit immo-
bility (Maier and Watkins, 2005). Survival intelligence therefore
involves an adaptive fear system in which specific parts of the
hierarchy are recruited as a function of the perceived intensity
(e.g., proximity) of the threat.
Neurohierarchical Models of Survival
Circuits
Anatomical work suggests that the neurobiological systems that
underlie the threat response are mapped along a hierarchical con-
tinuum (Figure 2). Based on non-human primate anatomy, Price
has proposed that two core prefrontal cortical networks exist:
(i) the medial prefrontal (mPFC) and (ii) the orbital prefrontal
FIGURE 2 | The Medial PFC network. (A) Based on non-human
primate research, the major connections of the medial PFC, include the
amygdala, PAG, hypothalamus, ventromedial striatum, pallidum and
mediodorsal (MD) thalamus. (B) The medial PFC occupies the medial
surface of the PFC, encompassing Brodmann’s areas 32, 2, 14, 10,
and 24 (adapted from Carmichael and Price, 1994). McNaughton and
Corr’s (2004) parallel neurocircuits of (C) defensive avoidance and (D)
defensive approach.
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(OFC). The OFC network is conceptualized as a set of regions
involved in multisensory processing such as taste, sight and
sound (Price, 2005; Price and Drevets, 2010) and as such, is likely
to be involved in the perception of threat. The interconnected
mPFC network, however, is involved in the active experience of
emotion. The mPFC network encompasses projections between,
among other regions, the medial surface of the PFC, the amyg-
dala, hypothalamus and periaqueductal gray (PAG). The pres-
ence of reciprocal connections between segments of the medio-
dorsal thalamus and PFC, as well as robust afferent connec-
tions from the amygdala, supports this network’s role in affective
processing. Other thalamic nuclei, including the periventricu-
lar nucleus, receive projections from the dorsal PAG, and dorsal
raphe nuclei (DRN) and are reciprocally connected to the amyg-
dala and ventral striatum, supporting the role of the periventric-
ular nucleus in stress responses (Price and Drevets, 2010). The
mPFC network thus acts to regulate the experience of emotion,
interacting with regions known to be involved in social percep-
tion, biological motion, social behavior, and memory including
the superior temporal sulcus (STS), posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC), and hippocampus. Recent work suggests a role for a
salience network involving attentional focus mediated by nore-
pinephrine and acetylcholine, and corticosteroids. Tonic nore-
pinephrine activity originating from the locus coeruleus (LC)
supports enhanced environmental scanning and reorientation
of attention at the cost of selective task focused attention, and
eliminates the attentional blink phenomena (Hermans et al.,
2014). Attentional blink is the inability to detect the second of
two quickly presented stimuli in succession and has been asso-
ciated with phasic LC firing that leads to a refractory period
in which subsequent LC responses are inhibited, and subjects
are unable to detect the second stimuli. Above some affective
threshold, activity in salience circuits that include LC, amyg-
dala, and thalamus and their projections to PFC areas may
impair PFC function in favor of midbrain, fixed systems result-
ing in rigid response type behavior. After this response is ini-
tiated, a slower acting corticosteroid response occurs, which
eventually dominates and renormalizes the system. Canonical
associative learning is enhanced during the acute stress period
when norepinephrine activity peaks, while subsequent corticos-
teroid action serves to mute emotional effects and interference,
reduce anxiety, and sympathetic arousal enabling the organism
to bring flexible systems back online to optimize subsequent
actions.
McNaughton and Corr (2004) have also proposed a set of
neural circuits associated with defensive approach and defen-
sive avoidance (Figures 2C,D). The defensive approach sys-
tem extends from the dorsal prefrontal cortex → posterior
cingulate → hippocampus → amygdala → medial hypotha-
lamus → PAG. On the other hand, the defensive avoidance
system is mediated by the ventral prefrontal cortex → ante-
rior cingulate→ amygdala→ hypothalamus→ PAG pathway.
These neuroanatomical pathways are further supported by neu-
roanatomical research on non-human primates (Öngür et al.,
2003; Price, 2005) and rodents (Fanselow, 1991, 1994; Bandler
et al., 2000) and are also closely aligned with what Panksepp calls
the FEAR circuitry (Panksepp, 2011)—the prosencephalic system
propounded by Canteras et al. (2001). These fear circuits have
been further clarified by the mapping of parallel circuits via the
hippocampus, septum, hypothalamus and PAG (Gross and Can-
teras, 2012). Furthermore, distinct types of fear may have discrete
pathways from the amygdala-hypothalamus and PAG (Gross and
Canteras, 2012). LeDoux has recently proposed that such cir-
cuits assist in the survival of the organism by organizing brain
functions that are optimized for adapting to different ecological
threats (LeDoux, 2012).
In humans, the existence of these networks has been sup-
ported by brain imaging research using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) and employing an active avoidance
paradigm where the goal was to actively evade an artificial
predator with the capacity to chase, capture and shock the
subject. Results showed that when the artificial predator is dis-
tant, increased activity is observed in the ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (vmPFC). However, as the artificial predator moves
closer, a switch to enhanced activation in the midbrain PAG is
observed (Mobbs et al., 2009) This finding was later replicated
and extended by showing that panic-related motor errors (wrong
button presses resulting in collisions with the virtual walls of the
maze) correlated with increased activity in themidbrain PAG and
dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN); (Mobbs et al., 2009) as did placing
a Tarantula progressively closer to the subject’s foot while they
were supine in an MRI scanner (Mobbs et al., 2010). The studies
are supported by human diffusion tensor imaging showing white-
matter connections between the midbrain and PFC (Hadjipavlou
et al., 2006).
Overview of the Human Survival
Optimization System
The long-term survival of the species depends on the ability
to learn from, and optimally respond to, a potential or real
threatening stimulus. We therefore propose five strategies that
are central to survival: prediction; prevention; threat orienting;
threat assessment; and rapid reaction to imminent danger at
varying defensive distances (Figure 3). Furthermore, we propose
that these strategies are influenced by (i) modulatory systems
that directly up or down regulate the five survival strategies by
actively reconfiguring the threat circuits. These include: cogni-
tive appraisal/regulation, interoceptive contexts, and metabolic
drives. Feeding into these strategies and modulatory systems are
a set of (ii) learning systems that include the utilization of inter-
nal probabilistic models, and vicarious learning. These features
distinguish the SOS from previous models (c.f. McNaughton and
Corr, 2004; Blanchard et al., 2011; Woody and Boyer, 2011), for
example, the security motivational model put forward by Woody
and Boyer (2011). These authors suggest that the security moti-
vational model is switched on when a stimulus is judged a poten-
tial danger. This results in elevated anxiety where the organism
appraises the situation, and results in a set of security behaviors
(motor and visceral). These behaviors are species specific. These
features of the security motivational model clearly overlap with
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FIGURE 3 | The Survival Optimization System (SOS). (A) Fanselow and
Lester’s “Threat Imminence Continuum” (B) The SOS proposes that five
strategy systems that are associated with predatory imminence and
processed in a serial or non-serial manner. Each stage is modulated by
several interacting systems including a cognitive system that selectively
controls and regulates survival strategies along an abstract to concrete threat
continuum. Internal probabilistic models subconsciously learn about, and
facilitate responses to, threat. As one moves from predictive to defensive
systems, innate and fixed systems are increasingly engaged. PE, prediction
error; FFF, Flight/Fight and Freeze.
our model. However, there are several features that distinguish
our model from others:
• No human behavioral model based on threat context, such as
those laid out by Fanselow and Lester (1988) and Lima andDill
(1990) has been put forward.
• We further link these ecological models to the neuroanatomi-
cal circuits that underlie survival.
• We tie these neural circuits into three core domains of
behavior: (i) “pre-encounter” avoidance (ii) “post-encounter”
directed escape and (iii) circa-strike indirect escape.
• We also incorporate recent advances in cognitive neuroscience
including recent work on cognitive reappraisal and cognitive
control and how these can tune both learning and survival
strategies.
• The SOS incorporates recent advances in learning theory (e.g.,
social learning, computational accounts of learning).
Five Survival Strategies
Prediction Strategies
The conscious prediction and simulation of future threat occurs
during preferred safety context and pre-encounter threat and
allows animals to prepare for, and flexibly attend to, potential
danger. In humans, the highly developed ability to envisage, sim-
ulate and predict future scenarios allows us to modify our current
behavior to prepare, escape, or even avoid possible future dangers
(Suddendorf andCorballis, 2007). The prediction of threat results
in precautionary behaviors, such as increasing alertness, environ-
mental surveillance and what we call pre-encounter avoidance
(i.e., avoiding threat before it is encountered). Furthermore, the
prediction system results in prevention strategies, such as niche
construction (Odling-Smee, 2003), risk dilution through living
in the safety of groups, building safe havens (e.g., defensive walls
or fortress) or constructing weapons. Therefore, a core goal of
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the prediction system is to avoid the encounter situation via
prevention planning or avoidance (Figure 1).
While basic predictions occur through simple Pavlovian
stimulus-response learned associations and instrumental actions,
complex predictions involving imagination, simulation, and ana-
logical reasoning, may, in terms of extent, be most enhanced in
humans. Prediction can occur through very basic environmen-
tal “what if ” cues (Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009) when escape
routes are minimal or opaque (how difficult or easy it may
be to escape a potential threat). Prediction formulations allow
humans to use memories of past events to simulate or imag-
ine the future and to consider what steps one might take
in order to optimize escape from a threat (Hassabis et al.,
2007). Imagination potentially allows one to remotely simulate
unpredictable predatory behavior while minimizing predatory
contact and energy exertion, thereby increasing the likelihood of
escape.
• Simulation and imagination. Although rodents seem to show
rudimentary forms of simulation (e.g., replay), the ability to
simulate and envisage the future may be uniquely human in
its complexity and critical to human survival (Corballis, 2013).
One benefit of prospective systems is the ability to antici-
pate threat as well as highlighting escape strategies without
experiencing actual danger. Simulation allows us to foresee
and pre-live danger that is presently absent (Suddendorf and
Corballis, 2007). Episodic memory stores personal memories
about everyday experiences and therefore is critical to simula-
tion and higher forms of prediction (Hassabis and Maguire,
2009). Episodic memory is not only crucial for remember-
ing past events, but also supports so-called mental time travel,
whereby humans both counterfactually remodel the past, and
foresee, plan and change the future (Suddendorf and Corbal-
lis, 2007). While not a universal ability, mental time travel has
been demonstrated in Great Apes (Mulcahy and Call, 2006)
and Corvids (Dally et al., 2006), and is known to be partic-
ularly sophisticated in humans. Recent studies have shown
that thinking about future consequences of one’s decisions
can influence current decision-making (Peters and Buchel,
2010) and it is possible that future-oriented survival encod-
ing produces superior memory retrieval for survival-relevant
information (Nairne et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2010).
• Predictive coding. Predictive coding is the theoretical proposal
that the brain actively infers sensory input. Consequently,
humans can efficiently disambiguate present from future
information, thus allowing faster and optimal responses to
threat. Summerfield et al. (2006) used fMRI to show increased
top-down connectivity from the PFC to the fusiform gyrus
during anticipation of forthcoming facial stimuli. These find-
ings were interpreted as evidence that the medial PFC resolves
perceptual ambiguity by matching what is expected or pre-
dicted to what is observed. Later research replicated these
findings, further demonstrating that predictive coding is asso-
ciated with activity within the medial PFC (Summerfield and
Koechlin, 2008). These findings suggest that the brain makes
active inferences about the sensory experiences we are likely
to encounter. The formulation of predictions by the brain
may serve to make quicker and more accurate decisions about
potential danger in the environment.
Prevention Strategies
During the preferred safety state and pre-encounter threat, the
ability of an organism to make accurate predictions concerning
potential threat is highly adaptive and enables it to flexibly change
behaviors to protect itself from future predation.We propose that
prevention takes two forms:
• Niche construction. Humans, and many other animals, deploy
various prevention strategies to reduce threats, including alter-
ation of the environment. Put simply, if it is possible to pre-
dict a predatory attack, it is often possible to prepare for it
in advance. This process, referred to as positive niche con-
struction, (Odling-Smee, 2003) involves active alteration of the
environment to increase the likelihood of survival. Animals
will alter their environment by building nests, burrows or tree
holes to protect themselves and their offspring. Rodents also
show an increased fear of open areas (e.g., elevated plus maze,
Pellow et al., 1985) and prefer to hide under ground. Humans
utilize advanced technology and cooperation to optimize pre-
vention strategies both in terms of scale and effectiveness by
building large walls and fortresses, living inside safe homes
and constructing prisons to contain the threat from danger-
ous criminals. Humans are more flexible and ingenious in the
implementation of prevention strategies and may do so with-
out any reason or in response to threats that may be encoun-
tered in the future. The knowledge that one is safe reduces the
stress of predation, allows for delayed dispersion of the off-
spring and allows for activities that might otherwise be risky
to survival.
• Group living. Evolutionary theorists have proposed that one
key reason why animals live in groups is to protect themselves
from predation. For example, Hamilton’s Selfish-Herd hypoth-
esis predicts that aggregations emerge from the organism’s
attempt to avoid predators resulting in a type of social gravity
whereby individuals move toward other members (Hamilton,
1971). This theoretical stance has been supported by stud-
ies showing risk dilution (i.e., reduced probability of attack
when in groups; Foster and Treherne, 1981), increased vigi-
lance to threat (i.e., the many eyes hypothesis; Roberts, 1996)
and group aggression where individuals cooperatively attack
or harass a predator (Kruuk, 1964; Dominey, 1983). Therefore,
group living is a key prevention strategy resulting in increased
protection from threat.
Threat Orienting Strategies
Detection of a potential threat initiates the post-encounter phase,
which in turn instigates a set of predictable behavioral strategies.
These strategies involve biological systems that have evolved to
orient toward salient events (Ohman et al., 2001; LeDoux, 2012),
and typically coincide with freezing. Mogg and Bradley (1998)
propose that the goal of attention is to facilitate the detection
of danger, and these threat biased attentions may take several
forms. Todd et al. have characterized this further by proposing
what they call an “affective control setting” which is a habitual
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mental set that favors motivationally relevant stimuli in a given
context and that “affective biased attention” allows us to attend
to certain categories over others. These authors further propose
that this may be a form of emotion regulation. Affective-biased
attention is driven by bottom-up systems, prone to learning and
acts as a filtering process tuned and retuned over development
(Todd et al., 2012). Attention therefore, may, be driven both by
a fast, hard-wired system as well as by a sophisticated top-down
filtering mechanism supported by predictions.
Attention and Vigilance
Threatening stimuli cause on-going behaviors to cease, and
lead to freezing and the orientation of attention toward the
threat (Blanchard et al., 2011). Heightened vigilance is costly
in terms of energy, loss of foraging opportunities, and disrup-
tion to ongoing goal-directed behavior (Eysenck, 1992). Vigi-
lance is therefore fleeting and restricted to times when high-
risk situations are predicted (Lima and Bednekoff, 1999). An
advantage of the prediction system is that it allows the ani-
mal to efficiently direct the vigilance system to detect danger
early, disambiguate stimuli, and ignore less salient information.
Heightened vigilance is accompanied by tonic catecholaminer-
gic action that increases environmental scanning and sensory
signal processing at the expense of selective filtering (Sara and
Bouret, 2012). While the signals processed contain more noise,
broader sampling likely increases the probability of detecting
potentially relevant stimuli outside of the current task set and
represents a conservative strategy to detect threat. The prediction
system may act as a balancing mechanism to optimize behav-
ioral selection and reduce the disadvantage of noisy signals. Early
detection via increased vigilance provides for additional time
allowing consideration of different strategies to escape threat.
Moreover, different pathways within the visual system may be
engaged by different types of threat, with magnocellular path-
ways suggested to process low spatial frequency visual infor-
mation and parvocellular pathways suggested to process high
spatial frequency visual information. Interestingly, research has
shown that the pulvinar and superior colliculus become active
to fearful faces presented at low spatial frequency but not high
spatial frequency, suggesting their exclusive involvement in the
magnocellular pathway and in accordance with their poten-
tial to provide “quick and dirty” information to the amygdala
about threat in the surrounding environment (Vuilleumier et al.,
2003).
Biologically Prepared to Detect Biological Stimuli
Brain imaging studies of attention to threat have been employed
to examine the neural substrates of emotion processing in
humans, and typically implicate the amygdala. Pictures of angry
faces evoke increased activity in the amygdala and parietal cortex
which suggests their involvement in attention to danger signals
(Mohanty et al., 2009). Ventrolateral PFC and the temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ), on the other hand, are proposed to be
involved in directing attention toward novel or new stimuli
(Sylvester et al., 2013). High levels of anxiety in humans may pre-
dispose one to possess a greater attentional bias to threatening
or potentially threatening stimuli. In support of the role of the
amygdala as an emotional saliency detector, damage to the amyg-
dala has been shown to attenuate the processing of rapidly pre-
sented aversive words shown in quick succession, known as the
attentional blink. Measures of state anxiety have been shown to
positively correlate with frontal and amygdala activity during the
presentation of threatening faces (Bishop et al., 2004b). Increased
amygdala activation to fearful faces has also been observed in
individuals scoring high on measures of trait anxiety (Ewbank
et al., 2009), patients with generalized anxiety disorder (Etkin
et al., 2004; Etkin and Wager, 2007) and soldiers suffering from
combat stress (vanWingen et al., 2011). Interestingly, highly anx-
ious subjects (Bishop et al., 2004a) and patients with PTSD (Shin
et al., 2005) also show marked disruption in the prefrontal cor-
tex. In conjunction with the prefrontal cortex, the amygdala may
work to cue an individual to environmental signals of interest
(Schafer and Moore, 2011).
Reducing Surprise
In the case of unpredicted danger, a prediction error occurs,
triggering the engagement of the attention system and providing
the animal with rudimentary information about the threat. The
individual is given little if any time to prepare the most opti-
mal course of action. Cortical regions such as the inferior pari-
etal cortex are known to be involved in attentional processing
directed toward salient and novel environmental stimuli (Got-
tlieb and Balan, 2010). The directed attention system is also
influenced by midbrain regions, including the superior colliculus
(Knudsen, 2011), parietal cortex, pulvinar and motor respond-
ing areas (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). The superior colliculus
is a crossmodal structure with motor layers that prioritize loca-
tions based on stimulus saliency and motor goals (Fecteau and
Munoz, 2006), and cholinergic and GABAergic circuits involved
in spatially selective enhancement of attention (Knudsen, 2011).
The superior colliculus relays information to the forebrain about
salient events (Knudsen, 2011). Midbrain attentional capture sys-
tems are therefore mechanisms that help to protect against the
predator’s stealth and surprise. Threat orienting is clearly broader
than just attention and involves the whole cognitive system
including perception, attention, and memory. Relatively unpre-
dicted threats are likely to cause higher levels of anxiety/fear
to manifest bringing about a stronger system-wide cognitive
reconfiguration to orient to the threat. Individual differences at
this level would mirror the processes at the Prediction System
level with, for example, anxious people having a higher inci-
dence of false alarms or bias because the system is configured
conservatively (Mogg and Bradley, 1998).
Threat Assessment Strategies
During threat assessment one needs to evaluate the context in
which the threat is encountered and generate an appraisal of dan-
ger (Blanchard et al., 2011). Human crisis management theory
proposes that responses to extreme threat include assessing a
negative event, determining a response option and evaluating
the utility of the response option (Sweeny, 2008). We propose
that there are several sub-stages (some functioning in paral-
lel) involved in assessing and acting upon information during
post-encounter threat:
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• Post-encounter freezing. When a potential threat is encoun-
tered, the first behavioral response of the animal will be to
freeze—a form of passive coping, defined as an absence of all
behavior except respiration (Bolles and Collier, 1976). Freez-
ing allows for improved risk assessment by the animal and
reduced detection by the predator, which in turn allows more
time to make the optimal response. Freezing behaviors are
instigated by the ventral columns of the PAG (vPAG) (Ban-
dler et al., 2000). Defensive freezing occurs when a threat is
detected and, in instances such as these, the amygdala and
extended systems may compile relevant environmental infor-
mation and signal the degree of threat to the vPAG (Fanselow,
1991). Indeed, efferents from the medial central nucleus of the
amygdala (CeA) to the vlPAG are not only critical to instigat-
ing freezing, but also to suppressing other motivated behaviors
such as foraging and mating (LeDoux, 2000).
• Threat monitoring. Threat monitoring is likely to engage yet
another set of neural systems that includes, but is not limited
to, the PFC and amygdala. One additional proposed region is
the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST). The BNST is
an important regulator of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
(HPA) stress axis (Georges and Aston-Jones, 2002) and lesions
of the BNST decrease anxiety (Duvarci et al., 2009). The BNST
is implicated in threat monitoring and vigilance and strongly
interconnected with the CeA and insula and has been sug-
gested to act as a relay center that coordinates motor, auto-
nomic and defensive reactions during sustained threat (Davis
et al., 2010). Along these lines, the BNST may monitor sig-
nals representing threat escalation in the environment (Davis
andWhalen, 2001; Walker et al., 2003; Somerville et al., 2010),
with a recent functional MRI study by our group showing that
the BNST was increasingly activated when subjects monitored
the movements (forward vs. backward direction) of a taran-
tula (Mobbs et al., 2010). Together, the amygdala and BNST
may keep track of escalating threat levels (e.g., predator move-
ments). Optogenetic work, however, suggests that the anatomy
of the BNST is more complex than previously believed. For
example, recent evidence shows that while the oval BNST inde-
pendently promotes states of anxiety, other anxiolytic roles are
found for the anterodorsal BNST (Kim et al., 2013).
• Safety seeking. With the added benefit of increasing the like-
lihood of escape from predators, monitoring the location of
safety is one strategy by which to decrease fear. Ecological the-
orists propose that animals maintain a margin of safety from
predators, which is the difference in time to reach cover by
prey and predator (Dill, 1990). Elland and Eller have shown
that gerbils use the most optimal trajectories to a safe refuge
(Elland and Eller, 2009). Safety searching is also particularly
prevalent in a number of affective disorders in humans. For
example, patients presenting with anxiety disorders, such as
panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, or agoraphobia
may, when provoked, exhibit safety behaviors such as check-
ing the proximity of hospitals and/or building exits (Rachman,
1983, 1984; Kamphuis and Telch, 2000). When under threat,
the sight of safety signals reduces fear (Gray, 1971). Indeed,
when subjects are placed close to a safety exit, measures of
fear decrease (Carter et al., 1995). Safety cues have also been
observed to abolish innate defense mechanisms in rodents,
such as threat-related analgesia (Wiertelak et al., 1992). One
region involved in safety learning may be the vmPFC. Activ-
ity in this region is increased in spider phobias after success-
ful reduction of fear via cognitive behavioral therapy (Straube
et al., 2006). Others have shown that a safety stimulus dur-
ing an aversive experience results in increased activity in the
vmPFC (Schiller et al., 2010) while decreasing threat also
results in increased activity in the same region (Mobbs et al.,
2010).
• Threat value. How the organism responds to a potentially
threatening stimulus is largely dependent on the threat value
it ascribes to the stimulus, with the amygdala and vmPFC
central to this process. The amygdalae basolateralis (BLA)
is suggested to be involved in the encoding of emotional
events. For example, researchers have shown that activity in
distinct neuronal populations in the anterior BLA coincided
with emotional state transitions between high and low fear.
Interestingly, these subregions of BLA are connected to the
hippocampus and medial PFC (Herry et al., 2008), regions
subserving anxiety, memory, and response formation. The
CeA, on the other hand, is a major output center, and may
be involved in the behavioral expression of fear (Balleine and
Killcross, 2006). The CeA may steer threat responses in the
midbrain through its connections to the hypothalamus via
neuropeptidergic (oxytocin) signaling (Viviani et al., 2011).
More recently, exciting research in rodents using optogenetics
and electrophysiology has implicated BLA-CeA microcircuits
in the control of anxiety (Tye et al., 2011). The amygdala may
therefore function as a gatekeeper or switch that first deter-
mines the threat value of a stimulus and then coordinates the
appropriate reactions to that stimulus, both defensively and
viscerally (Price, 2005). While the degree of danger posed by
a threat is an important component of models of threat value,
another component is implicated in the calculations relating
to the likelihood of threat escape by the animal. Here, the PFC
may be particularly important, playing a major role in coor-
dinating and instigating responses to risk assessment. Threat
exposure tests in rodents have implicated a coupling between
the infralimbic (il) PFC and the ventromedial orbital PFC.
That is, the ilPFC is involved in the careful evaluation of situa-
tions involving threat and the ventromedial orbital PFC facili-
tates ilPFC-mediated adaptive behavioral responses via inhibi-
tion of prepotent avoidant responses (Wall et al., 2004). Input
from the ilPFC to GABAergic intercalated cells (ITC) located
between the BLA and CeA may inhibit CeA output cells and
hence reduce the fear response while input from prelimbic
PFC has been shown to have the opposite effect, e.g., facilita-
tion of fear expression (Quirk and Mueller, 2008). As we dis-
cuss later, the dorsolateral and ventrolateral zones within the
PFC have been associated with the active inhibition of atten-
tion toward distractors and emotional reappraisal of prepo-
tent responses to distractors, or cognitive control of emotion
(Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Goldin et al., 2008).
• Predicting the actions of the threat. Simulation systems support
both the prediction (see above) and directed escape strategies
of the SOS (Figure 3). Furthermore, action prediction involves
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producing multiple simulations in order to predict the actions
the threat is likely to take, and the ensuing consequences of
each action. Therefore, the prediction system plays a critical
role in howwe respond to threat, especially when the organism
has time to choose between various escape options. There may
be many possible actions but whether the most optimal action
is chosen will depend on the quality of information available to
the prey. Cortical brain regions, such as the superior temporal
sulcus, have been shown to respond to multisensory infor-
mation such as sound and vision, (e.g., Hagan et al., 2009),
while subcortical regions may be responsible for using mul-
tisensory information to cross-validate location, time, sound
and identity information (Rao et al., 1997). These regions may
support the calculations suggested by Bayesian computational
approaches to describe behavior, discussed later.
• Action preparation and directed escape. Directed escape is
when the organism avoids the post-encounter threat by
actively choosing the most appropriate escape actions. Voli-
tional action under predation is likely to involve the neural
systems that underlie preparatory motor and aversive systems.
Self-initiated actions may be enabled via activation of the
supplementary motor area (SMA). For example, cells in the
SMA respond to self-initiated movements (Romo and Schultz,
1990), while ablation of the SMA and cingulate motor areas
results in disruption to volitional movement (Thaler et al.,
1995). Furthermore, the basal-ganglia acts as an interface
between emotion and motor responses, thereby playing a key
role in action selection and allowing the animal to transform
affective information into a motor response (Stocco et al.,
2010). Concerning aversive systems, the amygdala is one likely
candidate involved in aversive-biased action choice. For exam-
ple, ablation of the rat CeA suppresses the behavioral responses
elicited during exposure to a threatening stimulus, but pre-
serves the ability of the rat to redirect its course of action in
order to avoid subsequent exposure to an aversive stimulus.
Conversely, ablation of the BLA renders an aversive stimu-
lus unavoidable by the rat, despite the rat exhibiting normal
behavioral responses to the feared stimulus (Killcross et al.,
1997).
Recent fMRI evidence in humans has shown that the insula
is involved in the bodily urge to initiate motor actions (Yu
et al., 2010; Mobbs et al., 2013). Furthermore, the vlPFC (which
includes right inferior frontal gyrus [IFG]) receives direct input
from the striatum (Middleton and Strick, 2000) and is part of
the cortico-striatal-pallidothalamocortical loop. Research in non-
human primates also suggests that the lateral PFC is involved in
planning future actions (Mushiake et al., 2006). In humans, a dif-
fusion tensor imaging (DTI)/fMRI study by Aron and coworkers
showed the right IFG to be part of a wider cognitive con-
trol network that included the subthalamic nucleus and pre-
SMA (Aron et al., 2007). Other connections of the IFG, such
as those to the ACC and pre-SMA, may play a role in shift-
ing attention and in the initiation and suppression of move-
ment (Garavan et al., 1999). Dorsal parts of the ACC (dACC)
are connected to the premotor cortex and amygdala (Bates and
Goldman-Rakic, 1993) and, as such, are thought to modulate
both the control and monitoring of action (Amodio and Frith,
2006).
Defensive Strategies
Defensive strategies instantiated in the midbrain and
hypothalamus are typically evoked during circa-strike attack.
A fast-acting reaction system has obvious evolutionary benefits
and perhaps, not surprisingly, this reaction system resides in the
oldest regions of the human central nervous system. Price points
out that the first mammals were often preyed on by reptiles
and birds and consequently the mammalian brain evolved to
enable quick instinctive reactions (Price, 2005). Immediate threat
responses were, and continue to be, hard-wired spinal reflexes
that provide rapid reactions to threat (Lee et al., 1996). The
FFF-system also provides fast reflexive responses, but tends to be
more sophisticated. For example, when under direct attack (i.e.,
circa-strike), the animal will try to escape the situation. Escape
in this context is therefore indirect where the organism attempts
to terminate exposure to the attacking (or perceived attacking)
threat, yet has limited plan of action (Gray, 1971). If escape is
unsuccessful, the animal will either resort to fighting or “playing
dead.”
The PAG is the core neural substrate involved in FFF-
behaviors. The PAG is a midbrain structure that encircles the
cerebral aqueduct (Bandler et al., 2000) and can be divided into
four structurally and functionally distinct neuronal columns;
the dorsomedial, dorsolateral, lateral and ventrolateral aqueduct
(Bandler et al., 2000). Rodent studies show that mere exposure to
a predator leads to immediate increases in cFos gene expression
in the rostral dorsomedial/dorsolateral PAG (dm/dlPAG; Bandler
et al., 2000). Human fMRI studies also show a switch from the
ventral prefrontal cortex to the midbrain PAG area the closer a
threat moves towards its target (Mobbs et al., 2007, 2009, 2010),
thereby supporting the role of the PAG in negotiating highly
imminent threat. More specifically, the PAG is responsible for at
least two evolutionary conserved types of coping behaviors:
• Passive coping. Passive coping is typically associated with freez-
ing during threat detection and assessment and is instigated by
the vlPAG and its connection with the medial CeA (Bandler
et al., 2000). A recent optogenetic study showed that inhibitory
microcircuits in the lateral subdivision of the CeA gate the
medial CeA output, thereby controlling conditioned freezing
responses (Haubensak et al., 2010). Recent models of freezing
hold that different subtypes of freezing behavior are evoked
by distinct columns within the PAG, and that each freezing
subtype serves a different function (Brandao et al., 2008). For
example, Brandao et al. have shown that stimulation of the
dPAG elicits several types of freezing that differ in terms of
freezing onset time: (i) dPAG-evoked freezing where freez-
ing occurs during low intensity electrical stimulation; and (ii)
dPAG post-stimulation freezing, where freezing occurs after
electrical stimulation. Furthermore, stimulation of the vPAG
results in a form of freezing that is associated with the recovery
element of the defense–recuperative process. Freezing induced
by either dPAG or vPAG stimulation is hypothesized to occur
when threat is highly imminent or when the animal has been
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attacked. Thus, freezing may take several forms, some enacted
by post-encounter threats, others when the threat is high in
intensity such as that experienced during circa-strike threat.
• Active coping. Fight and flight are examples of active cop-
ing strategies and are mediated by the dmPAG and dlPAG.
For example, microinjections of excitatory amino acids placed
in caudal portions of the dlPAG result in flight behaviors
(Keay and Bandler, 2002) and chemical stimulation of the
dlPAG elicits uncoordinated panic-like behaviors such as vig-
orous running and jumping (Deakin and Graeff, 1991; Ban-
dler et al., 2000; Vianna et al., 2001). Moreover, lesions to
the dlPAG eradicate such bursts of activity (Depaulis et al.,
1989). In humans, activity in the PAG is observed during
highly proximal threat (Mobbs et al., 2007, 2009, 2010) and
electrical stimulation of the PAG results in panic-like symp-
toms, including feelings of terror, a desire to escape the situa-
tion, and hyperventilation (Nashold et al., 1969). In humans,
panic symptoms are thought to be mediated by the dPAG
and panic disorder patients show abnormal gray matter den-
sity in this region (Uchida et al., 2008). Panic disorder is
proposed to be associated with the dorsal raphe nucleus
(DRN)-periventricular pathway which includes projections
between the hypothalamus and PAG (Deakin and Graeff,
1991). Others suggest that the PAG detects respiration and
panic results from feelings of suffocation (Schimitel et al.,
2012).
The hypothalamus and PAG are key brain regions involved
in the fight responses that occur as a last ditch attempt to deter
predators. Stimulation of the hypothalamus in cats elicits “sham
rage” responses, including back arching, ear lowering, piloerec-
tion, striking and hissing behaviors (Reis and Fuxe, 1969). Lin
et al. used optogenetic techniques to show that stimulation of
the ventrolateral subdivision of the ventromedial hypothalamus
in rats results in the attack of conspecifics and inanimate objects
(Lin et al., 2010). The dPAG is directly connected to the hypotha-
lamus and is critical for active coping behaviors including fight
responses (Bandler et al., 2000). Stimulation of the PAG has
been shown to elicit aggressive behavior (Potegal et al., 1996).
It has been suggested that the PAG, amygdala and hypotha-
lamus together may comprise a rage circuit (Panksepp, 1998).
Indeed, the PAG has been suggested to play a role in evaluating
the emotional content of frustrating events, perhaps, through its
connections with hypothalamus, medial PFC, and insular cortex
(Bandler, 1988).
Escapability
The presence of an escape route may, in part, determine an
animal’s decision to either freeze or flee from danger (Blan-
chard and Blanchard, 1989). Studies of learned helplessness in
rodents demonstrate that, when faced with inescapable electric
shocks in one environment, rodents do not attempt to escape
electric shocks in a different environment (Seligman and Maier,
1967). Neurobiological, combined with pharmacological, work
has shown that the DRN receives signals about the controllability
of the threat from infralimbic and prelimbic sectors of the ven-
tral mPFC in rodents and that Muscimol knockout of this region
results in indiscriminate firing by the DRN (Amat et al., 2005).
Interestingly, in healthy humans, the mPFC, including the ros-
tral ACC, becomes active when subjects are chased by a highly
inescapable threat (Mobbs et al., 2009). The DRN, which con-
tains around 30,000 neurons in the rodent, is unlikely to modu-
late complex processes (Maier and Watkins, 2005), yet it receives
dense connections from regions where complex signals are pro-
cessed in the forebrain, such as the amygdala and PFC (Amat
et al., 2006). Moreover, exogenous opioids activate DRN 5-HT
neurons by inhibiting gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) recep-
tors at neurons within the DRN. The DRN is a major component
of the 5-HT system and, as a site of action for serotonin-specific
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), is thought to be critical in the patho-
genesis of anxiety and panic (Deakin and Graeff, 1991; Maier and
Watkins, 2005).
Preparing for Contact: Analgesia
The importance of analgesia is clear—it facilitates escape by
reducing pain in the injured animal. The alternative is that the
animal is unable to move due to intense pain or tissue damage,
and will most likely die as a consequence. Analgesic systems are
likely to be evoked prior to attack, for example, when the ani-
mal is pursued by a predator. The PAG, together with the dorsal
horn of the spinal cord and several cortical areas (Petrovic et al.,
2002), also plays a key role in eliciting endogenous opioid and
non-opioid analgesia. Analgesia might require imagined or antic-
ipatory activation of the US representation in order to prepare
the organism for a nociceptive outcome (Hollis, 1982). This pro-
cess, which accompanies the Post-Encounter stage, is thought
to evoke the endogenous opioid system (Fanselow and Lester,
1988). Stimulation of the rodent lateral or dorsal PAG results in
heightened threat and non-opioid-dependent analgesia (Comoli
et al., 2003). In humans, the PAG is active during both placebo
and opioid analgesia (Petrovic et al., 2002), suggesting that the
basis for placebo effects might lie within the brain’s ability to
anticipate injury.
For the Defense System, the “behavioral options” are clearly
within the hard-wired FFF-complex and involve escape reflexes.
The “cognitive operation” is limited in the sense that there is no
time for the cognitive system to have a significant influence (e.g.,
“strategic” decision making during indirect escape). However, it
is plausible that faster “intuitive” cognitive systems may optimize
the organism’s response to imminent threat. The “strategic” cog-
nitive system could also help by providing learned information
about the environment, including escapability, and allow for the
control of behavior or affect. The degree of affect and the ability
to regulate it may determine the amount of cognitive flexibil-
ity available (being cool under pressure vs. fighting or fleeing).
One interesting proposal is that individual differences in these
different proclivities will relate to psychopathology.
Modulatory and Learning Systems
We propose that survival strategies are influenced by two
core systems. (i) Modulatory systems include cognitive
appraisal/regulation, memory of encounter situations, inte-
roception, motivation, metabolic needs, and the functioning
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of domain-general cognitive machinery which is integrated at
both the emotional regulation and strategy; and (ii) Learning
systems include internal probabilistic models and vicarious
learning. Modulatory systems have direct control over the five
survival strategies of the SOS. On the other hand, the learning
system optimizes survival strategies and modulatory systems
by providing probabilistic information and drawing on other
information that is relevant to the situation (i.e., learning about a
threat from others). Modulatory Systems can override Learning
Systems. For example, our own personal encounters can override
those learned vicariously.
Modulatory Systems
Given the sheer diversity of threat humans encountered on their
voyage to conquer the world, it is clear that we needed a flexible
system that controls how we appraise (e.g., Mobbs et al., 2006;
Barrett and Kensinger, 2010) and manage threat responses. An
efficient system should flexibly tailor responses to specific cir-
cumstances via a set of ecologically-learned actions which would
confer the greatest benefit to the survival of species. According to
the “risk allocation hypothesis,” risk of predatory attack changes
over time and this has a direct effect upon intensity of vigilance
and time spent foraging (Lima, 1990).
Reappraisal and Suppression
Two ways of actively controlling a survival behavior are through
suppression (actively keeping threat or information about threat
out of mind) and reappraisal—actively changing the way one
thinks about a threat or information pertaining to threat. While
most prominent during prediction and threat assessment, these
deliberate conscious processes clearly influence all survival strate-
gies of the SOS, albeit with decreasing efficacy as one moves
down the defense gradient. Indeed, Ohman and Mineka point
out that automatic responses, such as those instantiated in the
FFF-system, are likely to be impenetrable to conscious cogni-
tive control. In the face of this decreasing control, there is lit-
tle doubt that conscious reappraisal would play a major role in
both prediction and threat assessment systems when the threat
is distal and there is time to think. Candidate neural regions
involved in cognitive appraisal include dorsomedial, ventrolat-
eral (vl) and dorsolateral (dl) PFC. The vlPFC has been suggested
to be involved in reappraisal of emotion (Wager et al., 2008) and
control of attention (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). The dlPFC has
been implicated in cognitive operations such as behavioral selec-
tion, top-down control of memory, attention maintenance and
suppression of unwanted memories (Anderson and Phelps, 2001;
Baird and Fugelsang, 2004; Gordon et al., 2004; Bechara and Van
Der Linden, 2005). In relation to the rostro-caudal model of cog-
nitive control, the dlPFC has been implicated in sensory and
contextual levels of control (Badre and D’Esposito, 2009). Given
these roles, the dlPFC is an important part of the behavioral
inhibition circuit that controls prepotent emotional responses,
otherwise known as a cortico-striatal-thalamocortical loop (Mas-
terman and Cummings, 1997; Owen et al., 1998; Middleton and
Strick, 2000). Systems that detect and resolve conflict represent
an important extension of top-down control processes by PFC
(Cavanagh et al., 2013). Again, these processes would presumably
be highly beneficial during threat assessment.
Regulation
Closely allied with the active processes of reappraisal and sup-
pression is the ability to passively regulate the survival circuit.
A candidate region for this operation is the subgenual ACC
(sgACC)—a region known to play a role in mood regulation,
extinction, stress responses and learned fear (Phelps et al., 2004;
Mayberg et al., 2005; Corcoran and Quirk, 2007). Interestingly,
the sgACC is connected to the amygdala and other parts of the
threat circuitry (i.e., PAG) and sgACC activity has been shown
to be disrupted in many affective disorders such as depression,
bipolar disorder and PTSD (Price and Drevets, 2010). Mayberg
et al. (2005) conducted a cutting-edge study whereby electrodes
were implanted in the sgACC of patients with treatment-resistant
depression. Following stimulation of the sgACC, remission of
depression was observed in the majority of patients (Mayberg
et al., 2005). Mayberg et al. work has since been supported in
rodents using optogenetic methods, thus further supporting the
role of the vmPFC (including the sgACC) in the control of emo-
tion (Covington et al., 2010). More recently, we have shown that
when subjects are trained using an emotional working memory
task, they become better at reappraisal when viewing negative
stimuli. This increased ability is predicted by increased activity
in the fronto-parietal network and the sgACC (Schweizer et al.,
2011, 2013). Although more research is needed, this suggests that
the sgACC interacts with cognitive networks involved in affective
regulation and suppression.
Interoception and Feeling
Signals from physiological and hormonal systems serve as crit-
ical contexts (Maren et al., 2013) influencing optimal decision-
making (Damasio, 1994). Critchley and Nagai (2012) suggest
that: “The changing representation of internal bodily ‘self ’ exerts
a dynamic contextual effect on emotional processing.” Further-
more, there is consensus on how people rate their bodily sensa-
tions of fear and anxiety (Nummenmaa et al., 2014), yet these
sensations can be misinterpreted. For example, Schachter and
Singer demonstrated that when people are given a sham vita-
min injection (which in reality was a norepinephrine agonist that
increases autonomic arousal), the cognitive labeling of their emo-
tion experience was altered. As Schachter and Singer explained,
subjects search the context for an explanation of their physiolog-
ical experiences, irrespective of whether the context was respon-
sible for generating those experiences (Schachter and Singer,
1962). The dACC activates during sympathetic-excitation includ-
ing heart rate, blood pressure and pupil dilation (Critchley et al.,
2001), while the insula may generate an autonomic signal used
to promote avoidance of possible aversive outcomes (Yu et al.,
2010).
Research has shown individual differences in the ability to
detect one’s internal bodily state. When Critchley et al. asked
subjects to detect their heart rate, they found that when they
compared interoceptive (detecting one’s heartbeat), to extero-
ceptive attention (detecting different notes), there was increased
neural activity in the bilateral region of the anterior insula. The
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authors suggest that the anterior insula is involved in the sub-
jective awareness of visceral feelings (Critchley et al., 2004). The
importance of interoception on decision-making has been exem-
plified by Dunn et al. (2010) who extended on these early studies
by showing that participants who were better at keeping track of
their heartbeat, were better at tracking their subjective arousal
ratings and this ability facilitated intuitive decision-making.
Other Survival Considerations: Metabolism,
Energy, Reward, and Homeostasis
Critical to the SOS is the idea that animals have to weigh the
risk of predation with a need to satisfy their metabolic needs
(Sapolsky, 2004; Barrett, 2005). These two pressures are in direct
competition with each other. Closely related to this phenomenon
is Lima et al. (1985) energy-predation risk trade-off model. Their
model was based on the observation that ground squirrels some-
times eat food immediately when the threat of predation is high,
but other times take food to the safety of their tree. The lat-
ter strategy is inefficient in the sense that more energy is con-
sumed when carrying food back to safety—energy that could
be used to escape predators. While the authors supported this
trade-off, they also found that when the food was close to the
tree, the squirrels would carry the food back to the tree, sug-
gesting that when energy consumption was relatively low, the
optimal behavior was to prioritize safety. However, studies show
that hunger changes the dynamics of the energy-predation risk
trade-off (Sih et al., 1988). Milinski andHeller (1978) showed that
hungry Sticklebacks will change feeding behavior in an effort to
maintain predator vigilance. This cost-benefit behavior extends
to arthropods. For example, hungry spiders (Pardosa Milvina)
show a pattern of consuming the same amount of food when
under predation, compared to non-predation. However, when
sated, they consumed significantly fewer prey when under pre-
dation risk (Persons et al., 2002). Although little work has been
carried out in humans, Symmonds et al. (2010) showed that sub-
jects’ risk preferences weremediated by theirmetabolic state. Fur-
thermore, people make poorer health judgments when hungry
(Tal andWansink, 2013). Together, it seems that when metabolic
needs are high and when starvation is imminent, the SOS would
be reconfigured to aid the immediate optimal survival response
(e.g., consumption of food).
Learning Systems
While innate neural mechanisms prepare us to react to ecologi-
cal dangers, our experiences are responsible for shaping how we
navigate the world. A critical component of the SOS is the abil-
ity to continually update and modify responses through learn-
ing (e.g., outcome evaluation and prediction error). Flexible
learning systems modulate both soft-wired higher order systems
such as prediction, and basic associative systems (i.e., Pavlovian
and instrumental conditioning) including hard-wired attention,
autonomic and flight, fight and freezing (FFF)-responses. While
associative learning is a component at all levels of the SOS,
more complex predictions and simulations involve probabilis-
tic models that increase the effectiveness of behavioral responses.
Probabilistic models can be learned and refined via direct experi-
ence with threats or by observing others under attack.
Encounter (Face-to-Face) Learning
Threat encounters that do not result in death provide valuable
information that results in an increased ability to avoid future
threats with specific predators. Associative learning is conserved
across most species, providing quick and decisive actions based
upon experience. Given its importance and effectiveness across
evolutionary history, this type of learning plays a role in all lev-
els of the SOS model, influencing and guiding many behavioral
actions. For instance, animals will associate a particular context,
event or particular actions with threat. These features become
bound together such that future encounters with a similar con-
text, event, or particular actions evoke representations of their
consequences, resulting in physiological changes and prompting
the organism to action. This type of learning is highly adaptive,
quickly generating a more accurate representation of the world
and its potential threats in order to optimize survival behaviors.
Simple computational models proposed by associative learn-
ing theories are effective in describing how organisms learn about
threats. Pavlovian conditioning involves the strengthening of a
stimulus-outcome association, while instrumental conditioning
involves the strengthening or weakening of a behavioral action
based on its consequences. These simple types of learning can be
further enriched, For example, in Pavlovian-Instrumental Trans-
fer (PIT) an instrumental behavior is influenced by a Pavlovian
stimulus. For example, PIT occurs when the animal hears the
sound produced by the predator, and then further avoids the
predator’s territory. PIT effects can be specific or general, depend-
ing on whether the Pavlovian stimulus influences the vigor of
responding of an instrumental action previously paired with the
same or different outcome as the stimulus. In both rodents and
humans, these two forms of PIT have been shown to rely on dif-
ferent sub-regions of the amygdala (Corbit and Balleine, 2005;
Prévost et al., 2012) and the striatum (Bray et al., 2008; Talmi
et al., 2008; Corbit and Balleine, 2011).
Computational models of increasing complexity have been
developed within the theoretical framework of associative learn-
ing. These models make various assumptions about the strength
of associations between stimuli and outcomes based upon the
sum total of coincidences leading up to a current state. Sub-
sequent pairings serve to update the organism’s expectation or
likelihood that a particular outcome will occur given a particu-
lar event or behavior. The most influential of these models was
proposed by Rescorla and Wagner (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972),
which argues that the strength of the conditioned response (e.g.,
freezing) depends on the associative strength of the CS (e.g., the
sound produced by the predator). In this model, the change in
associative strength1V for stimulus A (1VA) on a given trial, is
described by the following equation:
1VA = αβ(λ− VT)
The change in associative strength is directly related to the dif-
ference between the magnitude of the actual outcome λ, and the
associative strengths of all other CS’s present on that trial (VT;
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also called prediction error), and modulated by two learning-rate
parameters that take values between 0 and 1. The value of α is
determined by the salience of the CS, and that of β by character-
istics of the unconditioned stimulus (US). This model generates
two computational signals: expected value signals (i.e., “what do
I expect from this particular stimulus or action?”) and predic-
tion errors (PE) that update expectations (i.e., “what did I receive
compared to what I was expecting to receive?”). Organisms can
use these signals to indicate the magnitude of threat and guide
subsequent behavior. For example, if a particular sound produces
a strong expected threat signal, but the threat does not material-
ize, a PE signal will be generated. The PE signal will influence
future behavior when the same sound is encountered, modu-
lated by the current strength of the association. Thus, online
updating of learned associative information through these sig-
nals is a highly adaptive process that enhances survival behaviors,
including actions that result in swift reduction of threat. Several
studies suggest these signals and their subcomponents are rep-
resented in a number of brain regions in humans and animals,
most notably the amygdala, the ventral striatum, the medial PFC,
OFC, and VTA (Fanselow and LeDoux, 1999; Buchel and Dolan,
2000; Elliott et al., 2004; O’Doherty et al., 2004, 2007; Seymour
et al., 2005; Yacubian et al., 2006; Hampton et al., 2007; Prévost
et al., 2011). Until recently, appetite and aversive PE signals
were assumed to be integrated and underwritten by a single sys-
tem in the brain. However, recent findings suggest that aversive
PEs occur in distinct areas outside the brain’s dopamine driven
reward system. A pair of studies found evidence for aversive PE
signals in the amygdala and PAG (Roy et al., 2014), challenging
the commonly held assumption that a single system processes
both reward-based and aversive PEs. These findings highlight
the flexibility of neural circuits and the functions they can sub-
serve, and suggest that more complex and sophisticated sets of
computations can be carried out by phylogenetically older neu-
ral structures. This flexibility may also be responsible, in part, for
behavioral adaptability observed in natural ecology.
Another model predicts that attention to a stimulus will
decrease over time to the extent it proves to be a good predictor
of reinforcement (Pearce and Hall, 1980). Indeed, the Pearce-
Hall model assumes attention to a stimulus is necessary during
early associative learning and encoding, but not required once a
stable association has been established. In this model, VT repre-
sents the associative strength of all CSs present on the trial, as
in the Rescorla-Wagner model. However, rather than calculat-
ing a change in associative strength, the Pierce-Hall model solves
for the associability, α, of a stimulus A on a trial n, or αAn, by
subtracting VT from the intensity of the US. Neuronal activity
in both the rodent and human amygdala is associated with the
associability signals calculated using this model (Roesch et al.,
2010).
αAn = |λ− VT|n− 1
High values of the quantity λ − VT correspond to a high quan-
tity of information. A greater amount of information is conveyed
when observing unexpected outcomes than expected outcomes,
especially in circumstances in which uncertainty is high. The PE
value has an analog in information theory, in which information
quantity can be characterized as a measure of entropy, H(x) =
−6p(x) log P(x). Every source has associated with it a degree and
kind of uncertainty that is either expected (known range of unre-
liability) or unexpected (unknown, or violations of expectations),
and quantified by a value of entropy. Entropy from a source con-
strains the amount of information that can be communicated
by it, and is related to the uncertainty inherent in the timing
of the US. The CS conveys information about the US by reduc-
ing uncertainty. As a general rule outcomes that are unexpected,
i.e., have a low subjective probability of occurring according to
an internal model of an organism, reduce uncertainty, convey
more information than expected outcomes (when λ—VT is small
and H(x) is large) and may have a greater effect on subsequent
behavior or responses. In ecological terms, large values of the
modulus of the differential correspond to potentially important
information that should result in immediate direction or redi-
rection of attentional resources to the stimulus in order for the
organism to evaluate the magnitude of threat. This process drives
the strength of associability encoding of stimulus and outcome,
which is used by the organism to guide behavior when it encoun-
ters the same stimulus. In this model, changes in the modulus
will interrupt ongoing behavior in order to increase vigilance,
providing a threat reduction mechanism and enhance survival
behaviors. However, while this model captures learning about
associations, it fails to explain attentional redirection and vigi-
lance behaviors for high threat and highly reliable associations
that do not decrease in strength.
These models provide formal explanations for learning that
takes place during Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning and
are supported in both animal and human literature (Pearce
and Bouton, 2001; Delgado et al., 2008). Human fMRI has
revealed the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) to be activated dur-
ing aversive conditioning when pharmacologically manipulated
with a dopamine agonist (Menon et al., 2007). Interestingly,
the BLA has been implicated in attention (Roesch et al., 2012)
while the OFC and NAcc may relate to information about
expected values and outcome expectation (Roesch et al., 2010;
Li et al., 2011). However, these and other derivative models fail
to predict outcomes in changing contexts and circumstances,
notably exploratory behavior, novelty, uncertainty, and extinc-
tion (Miller et al., 1995; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Dayan and
Niv, 2008).
More recently, a “Hybrid model” that combines features of
the Rescorla-Wagner and Pearce-Hall models was developed in
the fear conditioning literature in humans (Li et al., 2011). As
expected, the amygdala was involved in tracking associability in
their task and the ventral striatum implemented reinforcement
prediction errors. Another class of models using Bayesian infer-
ence known as “model-based” models, involve more sophisti-
cated representations and computations about the world. This
class of models assumes that the nervous system maintains inter-
nal probabilistic models used to generate predictions about the
world, which are updated as the organism encounters and accu-
mulates external sensory information (see Knill and Pouget,
2004). Such a mechanism would be particularly valuable to
niche-independent animals where survival depends on fast and
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accurate responses to newly encountered dangers. Bayesian
models, in which the organism uses available evidence to build
a model and fine-tune its knowledge of the world and how it
works, differ markedly from association-based models, in which
the animal learns through crude associations. Incoming multi-
modal sensory information is comprised of noise and signals of
interest, andmust be processed effectively by the brain to produce
appropriate behaviors. Bayesian models examine the reliability of
information coming from a particular source and to a particular
sensory modality, and are used to integrate this information via
a weighted sum of the most likely outcomes (i.e., the direction
of a threat). This class of model can handle contexts in which
an organism is presented conflicting information and must use
the available information to make optimal behavioral decisions.
The ability to effectively handle ambiguous, or uncertain sensory
information is critical in natural ecology to avoid and limit threat
encounters. Emerging evidence suggests that Bayesian models
capture learning in both instrumental and Pavlovian settings as
well, and in some instances perform better than association-
based models (Prévost et al., 2013). The Bayesian framework has
been applied to model cognitive processes and learning ranging
from perception and attention to sensorimotor learning (Yu and
Dayan, 2005). Richer internal models and representations have
an advantage over less sophisticated associative models in that
they enable a greater degree of flexibility in behavior due to
their ability to make generalized predictions, i.e., about classes of
stimuli.
All of the models discussed above may be realized in differ-
ent contexts and utilized for specific survival purposes in natu-
ral ecology. Both the Rescorla-Wagner and Pearce-Hall models
assume a basic mechanism through which to avoid threat, while
Bayesian models assume a much more complex representation
of the possible dangers present in one’s environment. In the for-
mer models, feedback from threat situations is used to update
knowledge, with a particular emphasis on the associability or rel-
evance of the threat stimulus that will further strengthen associa-
tions and therefore learning about potential dangers in the case of
the Pearce-Hall model. On the other hand, potential threats and
the probability of their occurrence will be anticipated and pre-
dicted when Bayesian inferences are used and might therefore be
more optimal for threat avoidance and ultimately survival. These
models would therefore be evoked during the different survival
contexts laid out by the Threat Imminence, and Lima and Dill
models. For example, Bayesian models would be utilized during
the prediction and pre-encounter phases, Rescorla-Wagner and
Pearce-Hall models during post-encounter threat orienting and
circa-strike.
Vicarious Learning
Learning about threats via direct encounters is effective but
involves increased risk of death. A less dangerous and therefore
more optimal learning method is witnessing the experiences of
others. According to “Social Learning Theory,” knowledge trans-
fer depends on the willingness of the teacher to teach the desired
skill, and the ability of the learner to receive and retain infor-
mation, and to reproduce the behavior (Bandura, 1962). In a
classic study, Mineka et al. showed that socially transmitted fear
is critical to non-human primate learning (Mineka et al., 1984).
Likewise, humans and other animals will seek advice from oth-
ers when navigating unknown and unpredictable environments.
Vicarious learning has been observed in a variety of animals from
drosophila to mice. For example, a recent study showed that
“observer” mice learn vicariously through other “demonstrator”
mice when to freeze, and inactivation of the ACC impaired these
vicarious responses (Jeon et al., 2010). Another study featured
birds trained in captivity to perform an action required to solve a
puzzle and find food. These birds were then released into the wild
for observation. Other birds not trained quickly learned the adap-
tive behavior and were able to perform the same action to find the
food (Aplin et al., 2014). This suggests that vicarious learning is
more prevalent than once believed.
In humans, vicarious learning is certainly more sophisti-
cated and transmitted through multiple channels. These chan-
nels include conversation, reading or other modern-day media
such as radio, television, and the internet. Human behavioral
and brain imaging studies have shown that the vicarious trans-
mission of fear is mediated by the amygdala, ACC, and medial
PFC (Olsson et al., 2007; Olsson and Phelps, 2007), yet little is
known about the mechanisms. Price and Boutilier (2003) have
put forward a “Bayesian Imitation Model,” stating that we com-
bine the information learned through the observation of oth-
ers with the existing knowledge and data obtained through our
own personal experiences. While research into the computa-
tional mechanisms associated with vicarious learning is ongoing,
observational learning may be further explained by what Burke
and coworkers call “observational action prediction errors” and
“observational outcome prediction errors,” represented in dlPFC
and vmPFC, respectively (Burke et al., 2010). It may be that
these neural systems not only allow us to vicariously learn about
threats, but also to update our internal probabilistic models and
the PFC may play a critical role in such operations. Intriguingly,
the neural systems associated with vicarious learning are con-
nected to other systems that underlie social behavior and imagi-
nation, including the STS, temporal parietal junction (TPJ), and
PCC. Although one can only speculate, it is interesting that the
STS, TPJ and PCC are connected to the mPFC network pro-
posed by Price (2005) suggesting that complex neural systems are
connected to older defensive systems.
Bridging Data: Inference and Symbolic Thought
Humans possess an impressive ability to collate and bridge infor-
mation across numerous experiences and form new higher-order
representations. Inference allows one to produce new beliefs,
expectations and plans based on combining existing knowl-
edge (Mercier and Sperber, 2011). Penn et al. (2008) suggest
that such inferences can be based on hierarchical relations and
extend to unobservable cases such as others’ mental states or
the strategies of the potential threat. With these tools, humans
can simulate the actions of a threat and integrate this with other
information streams to rationally build new information about
the threat and anticipate ways to reduce future deadly encoun-
ters. For example, theorists point out that only humans can
reinterpret the world via hypothetical and unobservable enti-
ties (Povinelli et al., 2000) and this ability builds a capacity for
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symbolic relationship between simulating (unobservable) future
threat outcomes and ways to prevent such dangers by chang-
ing behavior. Although the exact mechanisms are still disputed
(c.f. Penn et al., 2008), theorists maintain that symbolic thought
is part of a domain-general operator that links many cognitive
modules and organizes them into a single “object file” (Kahne-
man et al., 1992).
Concluding Remarks
Evolution is the one true incremental scientist and the human
brain is one of its greatest accomplishments. Using theoretical
models from behavior ecology and behavioral neuroscience, we
propose five strategies that are central to survival: prediction
and prevention occur during pre-encounter threat; orienting
toward threat and threat assessment occur during post-encounter
and rapid reaction to imminent danger occurs during circa-
strike attack. Furthermore, these strategies are influenced by
many intervening variables including a modulatory system that
directly influences survival strategies by actively reconfiguring
the threat circuits. Feeding into these strategies and modula-
tory systems are a set of learning systems, which range from
simple associative learning to higher-order inferences. Support-
ing the SOS is a circuit extending from interconnected cortical-
hippocampal systems that support the prediction and simulation
of situations through to the PFC, amygdala and BNST associ-
ated with threat assessment and defensive FFF-behaviors in the
PAG and hypothalamus. While humans are confined to many
of the same evolutionary stable strategies that govern other liv-
ing organisms (Gray, 1971), we propose that the human SOS is
enhanced in the following operations:
• An imagination system characterized by rich representations
and capable of sophisticated simulations, including future
threat encounters.
• The ability to reduce threat by changing the environment
(niche construction) and forming social coalitions.
• The flexibility to willfully inhibit-excite survival strategies.
• To learn vicariously about threats and empathize.
• The ability to symbolically reason and bridge data to build new
information about threats.
Other animals possess rudimentary features of these operations,
yet the enhanced features of the human SOS allow us to ruminate
about the past and envision worrying futures. In the absence
of threat, both prediction and prevention strategies allow us
to minimize future interactions with danger. For example, in
face-to-face encounters, the tiger always wins and a system that
minimizes direct contact with life-endangering predators will
always be advantageous. It is also plausible that selection pres-
sures favored large cooperative social networks and niche con-
struction, both protecting us from a diverse array of threats and
allowing us to evolve perform other survival activities important
behaviors (e.g., farming). Conversely, these enhanced abilities
may leave us open to affective disorders that involve anticipation
or uncertainties concerning the future (e.g., anxiety), sensitiv-
ity to social rejection and the fear of leaving the safety of our
protective environment.
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